Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1992

State of Utah v. Michael McNaughton and Brent
Ziegleman : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; Utah Attorney General; Attorneys for Plaintiff.
W. Andrew McCullough; McCullough, Jones and Ivins; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, State of Utah v. Michael McNaughton and Brent Ziegleman, No. 920344 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/4292

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH CGtmT OF APPEALS
BRIEF

UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
.A10
£*
DOCKET NCX
l?ft'WCA

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
000O000

REPLY BRIEF

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 920344-CA

MICHAEL MCNAUGHTON,
Defendant,

Priority No. 11

and
BRENT ZIEGLEMAN,
Defendant and Appellant.

000O000—

Interlocutory Appeal from Order of
Fourth District Court of Juab County
Hon. George E. Ballif
W. Andrew McCullough (2170)
McCullough, Jones & Ivins
930 South State Street, Suite 10
Orem, Utah 84058
Attorneys for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam
Utah Attorney General
State Capitol Building, Room 236
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Plaintiff

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

FEB 1 6 1993
J*
Y

Mary T. Noonan
Clerk of the Court

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES. RULES
AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATi -N I.1DETERMINATIVE . . . .
SUMM^.K; •

:

POINT .

1'HE SEARCH I'ADE OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS
CONSTITUTIONALLY TAINTED; AND ANY PURPORTED
CONSENT TO SEARCH WAS INVALID

CONCLUSION

-*KGL:ME.N.

CASES CITED
Page
Sims v. Utah State Tax Commission, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 5
(Utah, 1992)

3

State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990)
State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992). . .

4, 6-7
7, 8

State v. Park. 810 P.2d 456 (Utah App. 1991), cert.
denied. 827 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991)
State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990) . . . .
State v. Simsf 808 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1991), cert.
pending. 181 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (October 4, 1991) . .
State v. Thurman. 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1993). . .

STATUTES AND RULES CITED
None

3
8
2-4
2-9

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
000O000

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.
MICHAEL MCNAUGHTON,

:

Case No.

920344-CA

Defendant,
and
BRENT ZIEGLEMAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
000O000

REPLY BRIEF
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES
AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE
Appellant

does

not

cite

any

additional

constitutional

provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations in this
reply brief, and does not here rely upon any such items.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The State has conceded that Defendant Brent Ziegleman was
illegally detained by Officer Bushnell.

The search made by the

officer during that illegal detention is constitutionally tainted;
and the evidence found must be suppressed.
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POINT I
THE
SEARCH
MADE
OF
DEFENDANT'S
VEHICLE
WAS
CONSTITUTIONALLY TAINTED; AND ANY PURPORTED CONSENT TO
SEARCH WAS INVALID•
The State of Utah, in its brief, continues to contend that the
initial

stop

of

Defendant

was

valid,

and

constitutional rights were not violated by it.

that

Defendant's

The State does,

however, concede that the continued detention of Defendant and the
change of the focus of that detention from speeding to car theft to
drugs was a violation of Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.
Having conceded that fact, the State of Utah now asks this Court to
completely ignore that illegal conduct and uphold the unlawful
search that resulted from it.
Before urging the Court to ignore its illegal conduct, the
State first adds a couple of additional concessions.

It concedes

that, under the cases of State v. Sims, 808 P. 2d 141 (Utah App.
1991)cert. pending, 181 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (October 4, 1991) and
State v. Park. 810 P.2d 456 (Utah App. 1991) cert, denied. 827 P.2d
327 (Utah 1991) the consent to search relied upon by the State
would be inadequate.

The State then sidesteps or ignores the

additional authority cited by Defendant in his original brief, and
contends that a recent Utah Supreme Court case, State v. Thurman.
203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1993) sweeps away all of Defendants
supporting authority. This, of course, is simply not true. First
2

of all, it is significant that the Utah Supreme Court denied cert.
on State v. Park, see 827 P.2d 327 (Utah, 1991).

Secondly, it is

even more significant that State v. Simsf is a companion case to
the Utah Supreme Court case of Sims v. Utah State Tax Commission,
198 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (Utah, 1992).

In that case, already briefly

referred to in Defendant's previous brief, the Utah Supreme Court
suppressed evidence ceased at an illegal road block. That decision
is clearly the law of the State of Utah; and nothing appears to
have happened since that decision to overrule or weaken it. State
v. Sims itself has been accepted for cert, see 181 Utah Adv. Rep.
9 (Utah, 1991) and it seems highly likely that, based upon the
companion case, the eventual decision will be a per curiam
affirmance. The illegal detention of the Defendant in Sims is very
much analogous to the illegal detention in the instant case. The
Supreme Court, in reviewing that situation first determined that
the roadblock where Mr. Sims was stopped was an illegal detention.
In discussing the evidence obtained after that detention, the Court
stated:
Regarding the temporal proximity factor, Sims' consent
was closely related in time to the initial stop. He
consented during the unlawful detention with no
intervening circumstances. The purpose of the roadblock
was to obtain evidence of criminal violations, a purpose
that does nothing to reduce the "f lagrancy" of the
constitutional violation it precipitated.
Trooper
Howard's request for consent to search Sims' vehicle was
based upon the smell of alcohol, the sight of an open
liquor bottle, and Sims' admission that he was carrying
3

alcohol. Howard's opportunity to make these observations
and to question Sims came about as a direct result of the
illegal seizure. Sims did not spontaneously volunteer
his consent, nor was he made aware of the fact that he
could decline to consent.
Given the totality of the circumstances in light of the
relevant considerations, the voluntary consent in this
case clearly was arrived at by exploitation of the
unconstitutional roadblock.
The consent did not,
therefore, purge the evidence of the taint of illegality.
198 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6-7.
Nothing contained in the recent opinion cited by the State
gives the indication that the Supreme Court has reversed itself on
the fundamentals of the exclusionary rule in the last three months
since the Sims decision was made.
The Utah Supreme Court, in the Thurman case, also did not
suggest an overruling of its earlier case in State v. Arroyo. 796
P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). In that case, the Utah Supreme Court put the
burden clearly on the State to prove that there was a valid consent
to a search by the Defendant.

In doing so, the State must prove

that the consent was not "obtained by police exploitation of the
prior illegality." 796 P. 2d at 688. This is stiLl the test. That
was confirmed, without a doubt, by the Utah Supreme Court in the
Thurman case when the Court stated:
In sum, to find that a defendant's consent following
police illegality is valid under the Fourth Amendment,
the prosecution must prove (i) that the defendant's
consent was given voluntarily, i.e., that the consent was
the product of his or her own free will; and (ii) that
the consent was not obtained by exploitation of the prior
illegality, i.e., that the connection between the consent
4

and the prior illegality was sufficiently attenuated that
excluding the evidence would have no deterrent effect.
203 Utah Adv. Rep. at 22.
Nowhere in the State's brief does the State give any plausible
argument for the fact that the consent to search obtained by
Officer Bushnell was "sufficiently attenuated" from the illegal
conduct of Officer Bushnell in holding Defendant for further
investigation.

In fact, the record is clear that everything that

the officer did was directed toward one purpose:

to find out why

Defendant was acting "guilty" and to catch him doing something
illegal.

The officer was convinced, from the moment he pulled up

along side Defendant's automobile, that Defendant was "guilty" and
he made no apology for that decision in the suppression hearing.
He made no apology for the fact that all of his conduct from that
moment on was designed to catch the "guilty" person and to see that
he was punished for his crime, whatever crime it might turn out to
be.

Defendant was stopped for that purpose, he was held for that

purpose, he was questioned for that purpose, and a search was
commenced for that purpose.
The facts set forth in the Thurman case show some rather
outrageous behavior on the part of the police officers involved in
that search.

Nevertheless, the court found that there was a

substantial "attenuation" between that outrageous conduct and the
consent to the search, which was obtained several hours later. The
5

Utah Supreme Court made that decision because the actual consent to
search that was at issue was made in writing, was made after
repeated "Miranda warnings" and was made well after the improper
police conduct. Additionally, the consent made by Mr. Thurman was
to the search of a storage unit which was completely separate from
the scene where the original police misconduct had occurred.

In

fact, the police did not appear to have any knowledge of the
existence of the storage unit to which they later obtained consent
to search.

Not only did Mr. Thurman consent to the search of the

storage unit, it is apparently he who brought the existence of the
storage unit to the attention of the police; and he did it after he
was warned by the police that he did not have to answer any
questions without an attorney present.
None of those attenuating circumstances existed in the case of
Mr. Ziegleman. Mr. Ziegleman was being held against his will while
Officer Bushnell frantically searched for some evidence of some
kind of crime. Unlike Mr. Thurman, no search warrant was issued at
any time by any magistrate whatsoever; and that additional check on
the raw power of the police did not exist.
In attempting to glide over the lack of the attenuating
circumstances required by both Arroyo and Thurman, the State has
referred to the Supreme Court's discussion of policy arguments. In
the Thurman case, there was a substantial discussion of the reason
6

reason behind the exclusionary rule in Fourth Amendment cases. The
Court said:
Arroyo's primary goal was to deter the police from
engaging in illegal conduct even though that conduct may
be followed by a voluntary consent to the subsequent
search. 203 Utah Adv. Rep. at 21.
The Thurman court, however, went on to grade the misconduct of
the police officer.

In discussing its grading system, the court

stated:
Where the misconduct is extreme, we will require a clean
break in the chain of events between the misconduct and
the consent to find the consent valid. . . . The same
type of break should be required where the evidence shows
that the police purposely engaged in conduct to induce a
consent.
Conversely, where it appears that the
illegality arose as the result of negligence, the lapse
of time between the misconduct and the consent and the
presence of intervening events become less critical to
the dissipation of the taint. 203 Utah Adv. Rep. at 22.
The State goes on to suggest that the illegality of the police
officer's conduct is grounded exclusively on the decision of this
Court in State v. Godina-Lunaf 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992). The
State therefore reasons that, because the conduct of the officer
occurred prior to the decision of this Court in that case, the
officer's conduct was a good faith attempt to follow the law. At
worst, the State argues that the officer's illegal conduct was
"arguably permissible" at the time, and that the officer was guilty
of no more than negligence.

Once again, this is simply not true.

First of all, the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to make
7

the stop in the first place. The authority cited by Defendant in
support of that proposition was well established in 1991 when the
stop was made.
Likewise, the authority cited by Defendant to challenge the
continued detention and the investigation of the alleged illegal
behavior, was not new at the time of the stop.

In Utah the major

authority for the proposition that the type of investigation
undertaken by Officer Bushnell was not legal is the case of State
v. Robinson, 797 P. 2d 431 (Utah App. 1990).

The later case of

State v. Godina-Luna is based extensively on the Robinson case; and
the latter case does not break new ground. Officer Bushnell knew,
or should have known, of the rules set forth by the Robinson court
in dealing with the type of situation that he confronted in this
matter.

He could not have had a good faith belief that his wild

search for something to explain the "guilty" behavior of Defendant
was justified.

The later decisions by this court that have

continued to strike down this kind of police behavior should have
come as no surprise to Officer Bushnell nor to the Attorney General
of the State of Utah.

The officer's behavior at the time of the

stop, the detention and the search was all one tightly connected
stream of behavior.

There is no way that the Thurman case can be

used by the officer to wriggle out of what he should have known at
the time he stopped Defendant: that he could not stop or detain a
8

Defendant without articulable suspicion of particular criminal
behavior•

The Supreme Court continues to require a clean break

between the illegal behavior and a search that comes out of it.
There is no such break; and any consent given by Defendant to the
search made by Officer Bushnell is hopelessly tainted.
The Supreme Court also clarified the standard of review of a
determination as to whether the consent was voluntary and was
sufficiently attenuated from the illegal conduct of the officer.
That standard is that this is a question of law, and is to be
reviewed for correctness (203 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26).
of the trial court was obviously not correct.

The decision

It was made on the

false assumption (conceded by the State) that the officer's conduct
in detaining Defendant was lawful.

Without this assumption, the

Court's finding and conclusion cannot stand and must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The evidence obtained by Officer Bushnell in this matter was
illegally obtained from Defendant; and the use of the evidence
should be suppressed.

Therefore, the ruling of the court below

denying the suppression should be reversed.
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DATED this

/ J

day of February, 1993.
MCCULLOUGH, JONES, & IVINS

W. Andre1
Attorney
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